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    Summary: KC Star investigative reporter Dan Margolies and telecom reporter Jason Gertzen dramatically point out how corrupt/dishonest Sprint executives were in their financial dealings (558,000 allowances?) before being ousted.  In reality there were very few differences between Ken Lay and Bill Esrey/Ron LeMay.  None ever felt they had done anything wrong despite hurting thousands of people.

http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/business/14948858.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp

Posted on Sun, Jul. 02, 2006


Depositions reveal story of ouster at Sprint
Testimony in a suit against the company gives new insight on two former top executives’ tax trouble and a leadership crisis.

 

By JASON GERTZEN and DAN MARGOLIES
The Kansas City Star
 

“We, then and to this day, don’t think we did anything wrong.”

William T. Esrey, former Sprint CEO, in An April 13 deposition.

In July 2002, two Sprint Corp. board members traveled to the mountain resort town of Eagle, Colo., to meet with the company’s longtime chairman and chief executive.

Their mission: Tell William T. Esrey it was time to step down.

“He was not pleased,” Stewart Turley, a former Sprint director who joined fellow board member Irvine O. Hockaday Jr. on the journey, recalled in a recent sworn deposition.

The dramatic meeting in Eagle marked a tipping point in the board’s support for Esrey, who along with the company’s chief operating officer, Ronald T. LeMay, was facing mounting financial pressure related to an Internal Revenue Service inquiry into personal tax shelters devised by the company’s corporate auditor.

The IRS had challenged the two executives’ use of tax shelters to shield some $287 million in taxable income resulting from their exercise of Sprint stock options in 1999 and 2000, a time when the company was pursuing its ultimately rejected merger with WorldCom.

The IRS investigation, which recent court documents indicate is continuing, threatened both executives with financial ruin if the tax shelters were disallowed. Even so, Sprint’s board continued to support them until what one board member called Esrey’s “line in the sand” demand for more pay in early 2002.

“My compensation for working was almost nothing,” Esrey said in April deposition testimony in a pending lawsuit against Sprint.

At the time, Esrey was paid $1.1 million in salary and given a $919,937 bonus.

The demand for more pay left key board members questioning whether Esrey’s concern for his precarious financial situation had begun to influence his decision-making, perhaps to the detriment of the company.

The trip to Eagle came shortly thereafter.

These and other fresh details about the ouster of Esrey and LeMay emerge from thousands of pages of sworn deposition testimony taken in recent months in the pending lawsuit. In the suit, disgruntled shareholders have challenged the fairness of Sprint’s 2004 recombination of tracking stocks that represented the value of its wireline and wireless operations.

An examination of those depositions sheds new light on a tumultuous period in the company’s history. The period culminated in a leadership crisis that gripped the Kansas City area’s largest corporate employer for nearly a year and led to a corporate governance reform effort under new CEO Gary Forsee.

Even today, the fallout from the leadership crisis continues to affect the company, now known as Sprint Nextel Corp. Top executives and board members have spent extensive amounts of time defending the suit. If the company loses the case, Sprint could be forced to pay billions of dollars in damages, according to calculations by the plaintiffs’ experts.

Plaintiffs’ attorneys offered copies of the depositions to The Kansas City Star after they were submitted to attorneys for defendants in the case for review, clarification and — at times — redaction of what they deemed confidential information under a protective order in the case.

“We only gave you the parts not designated confidential,” Jay Eisenhofer, one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, said in a phone interview with The Star. “Why that wasn’t done here, I have no idea.”

Current and former Sprint officials and attorneys for Esrey and LeMay declined repeated requests for comment. They contend that the plaintiffs’ attorneys violated the protective order by releasing the depositions.

As for Esrey, he remains dismayed by the turn of events more than three years after his departure. Indeed, he disputes that the products that led to his and LeMay’s ouster were properly characterized as tax shelters.

“We, then and to this day, don’t think we did anything wrong,” Esrey said in an April 13 deposition given in Santa Barbara, Calif.

New revelations

Among other things, the pending lawsuit contends that Esrey’s and LeMay’s tax problems influenced them to manage financial results to favor Sprint’s FON tracking stock over its PCS tracking stock. Esrey, LeMay and other top Sprint executives held substantially more FON than PCS stock.

“They hurt the PCS shareholders for years by manipulating the financial results and capital structure of PCS in a way to benefit the FON stock and shareholders,” Eisenhofer said.

Sprint vehemently disputes that contention. In court documents, the company argues that the recombination was driven by Sprint’s decision to bundle its services and to simplify accounting issues.

In the more than three years since the ouster of Esrey and LeMay, Sprint has offered scant details about the circumstances surrounding their removal. But the lawsuit’s depositions and other documents have begun to flesh out the picture.

One thing that the documents make clear is that Esrey increasingly clashed with Turley, a former chief executive of Eckerd Corp. who headed the Sprint board’s compensation committee. Ultimately, Turley, along with Hockaday, led the ouster effort.

“It got pretty tense, obviously, towards the end,” Lou Smith, a former chief executive of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and a Sprint board member from 1999 to 2005, said in his deposition.

The depositions hint at lingering tensions. When asked about his relationship with Hockaday, a former neighbor in Mission Hills, Esrey readily admitted they were friends. When asked the same question about Turley, Esrey responded, “I … I don’t care to get into that. I know Stewart Turley.”

Other details that emerge in the depositions:

•In 1999, 2000 and 2001, LeMay earned a total of $196 million and sheltered $195 million from taxes, according to the testimony of Linda Koch Lorimer, a senior official at Yale University and a Sprint board member. Lorimer said LeMay arranged to have nothing withheld from his income taxes during those three years by claiming no fewer than 558,000 withholding allowances, which include exemptions.

To arrive at that many allowances, tax experts say, LeMay would have needed a huge number of deductions or credits. Although it’s not known how LeMay arrived at that number, it’s possible they corresponded to the losses he anticipated claiming through his tax shelter, the experts say.

Likewise, Esrey in his deposition acknowledged that he might have taken tens of thousands of allowances.

•Esrey and LeMay insisted in their testimony that the board knew in advance of their plans to buy tax-planning packages from Ernst & Young, Sprint’s auditor. But other board members said they did not learn of them until much later. Some said they found out only after Esrey and LeMay disclosed to them that the IRS had questioned the validity of the tax shelters.

•Esrey proposed some kind of merger or acquisition deal involving telephone company Qwest Communications Inc., according to Turley’s deposition testimony. The board, however, rejected the proposal, dubbed project “Bugle.”

“It involved Bill in a way that we didn’t think was appropriate,” he said.

Turley referred to an apparently related transaction that would have provided a personal windfall for Esrey of about $20 million.

An attorney for Esrey did not respond when questioned by e-mail about Turley’s statements concerning the proposed transaction with Qwest.

Qwest spokesman Nick Sweers also declined comment.

•More than four years after the IRS began scrutinizing Esrey’s and LeMay’s tax shelters, their audits are continuing.

Sprint Nextel’s current chief operating officer and its top executive in Kansas City, Len Lauer, who also bought the Ernst & Young tax shelters, said in an April deposition that he had settled at least one tax shelter issue and was considering a proposed settlement of another.

Governance crisis

The management shake-up at Sprint stunned the Kansas City business community and the telecommunications industry.

Esrey, a Harvard business school graduate, had transformed United Telecom, a low-profile local telephone company, into the hard-charging Sprint, a growing long-distance and wireless business with a national presence. He had enjoyed solid support from board members, who lauded his bold vision.

But depositions portray those same board members gradually growing disenchanted with Esrey. Parts of Sprint’s business were struggling, and the company had acknowledged missteps that led to billions of dollars in write-offs.

Board members increasingly began to question Esrey’s judgment after learning of the questionable tax shelter, and after Esrey essentially asked the company to bail him out — a request some directors called greedy during board deliberations.

“I was not going to approve any increase of this type,” Smith said in his deposition.

Turley said he did not question Esrey’s credibility or his ability as a CEO. But, he said, “I questioned his judgment in this regard in looking to the board for relief.”

Although Esrey’s quest to save his job ultimately proved futile, he began with a bold opening gambit.

Early in 2002, Esrey threatened to leave the company unless he got a raise, according to Turley.

The meltdown in the tech and telecom markets during 2000 and 2001 had taken a toll on Sprint’s shares. The company’s stock was trading far below the levels it reached during the peak of the high-tech trading frenzy.

While Esrey earned a seven-figure salary and annual bonuses ranging from $220,000 to $1.38 million, stock options accounted for the bulk of his compensation. With Sprint’s share price so low, many of those options were “under water” — worthless — in 2002.

In Esrey’s view, he had been a valuable asset to Sprint. He said he had orchestrated a “brilliant” $5 billion refinancing package for the company in 2001, and taken other key steps to position the business for the future.

Any potential liabilities he faced from the IRS, Esrey said in his deposition, was “a side issue to what is appropriate compensation.”

Board members saw it differently.

“I think they had financial problems at that time and that was the driving force behind it,” Warren Batts, former CEO of Tupperware Corp., who served two decades on Sprint’s board, said in his deposition.

Nor did Esrey receive perfect marks for running the company.

“We were concerned about how effectively strategies and plans were being implemented,” Hockaday, former chief executive of Hallmark Cards, said in his deposition.

At one point, Esrey said he could make more money in retirement than continuing to work at Sprint, according to Turley. Turley subsequently had a consultant run independent calculations that disputed Esrey’s assertion.

By mid-2002, members of the board had had enough. Worried that Esrey’s tax problems would prove a distraction and could lead to a conflict of interest if he were to sue Ernst & Young, they were ready to pressure Esrey to step down.

“We felt that we had more or less crossed a bridge and that it was, you know, time to move on with a change in the company,” Turley said.

“Their personal wealth and personal well-being was in serious jeopardy,” Turley said. “And I think as time went on, the board had a better and better understanding of the depth of this.”

In July 2002, Hockaday and Turley were dispatched to Colorado to tell Esrey he should take early retirement. The meeting between the men lasted no more than an hour.

Esrey reacted with surprise and disappointment, Turley recalled. After the meeting, Esrey phoned Hockaday and Turley and tried to change their minds. He said a change of management would hurt the company.

After the meeting in Eagle, Esrey backpedaled on his pay demands. He told board members that he wanted to stay with Sprint even if his pay remained the same. He began to downplay his tax and financial problems.

Meanwhile, even as the board pushed Esrey out the door, it still considered LeMay a leading candidate to succeed him. Ultimately, though, the board concluded that it would be embarrassing to name a new CEO who could be forced into personal bankruptcy by his own tax shelter problems, which were even bigger than Esrey’s.

In December, Esrey and LeMay made a final, impassioned pitch to save their jobs. At a two-hour dinner meeting with board members, they made an elaborate presentation on how effectively they had managed the company in good times and in bad.

It didn’t work. In February 2003, Sprint formally announced Esrey’s departure, followed by an announcement in April of LeMay’s retirement. Esrey got at least $10.5 million — and possibly millions more — in severance pay. LeMay got at least $5.7 million — three times his salary and bonus in 2002.

“I was asked to leave, and I did,” LeMay said in his deposition.

Esrey left, too, but his unhappiness over his ouster persists.

In his deposition, Esrey said that he disagreed with the board’s concern that the tax cases “would ultimately come out and be public, which we did not have a problem with, because we, then, and to this day, don’t think that we did anything wrong.

“We relied on the advice of Ernst & Young, and had no issues that we were trying to, you know, hide or sweep under the table at all.”

Reform push

Even after pushing out Esrey and LeMay, the Sprint board’s reputation was tattered.

In 2003, The Corporate Library ranked Sprint’s board one of the nation’s worst, pointing to lax oversight of the company and a lack of leadership.

Forsee, who arrived from BellSouth as Sprint’s new chief executive in spring 2003, made corporate governance a top priority even as he directed strategic maneuvers intended to stabilize the company and position it for a major merger with Nextel Communications.
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